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Introduction.
The effect of a persons death upon his real property is
determined ultimately by the law,but primarily by the conduct
of the deceased himself during life.If he has contracted debts
which remain unpaid,it is quite possible that his real prop-
erty may be taken for their payment.If he has taken unto him-
self a wife and leaves her still alive and legally his wife,
death vests a complete ower right in that property at once:
or if the deceased person is a married woman,has had.chlldren
and has not otherwise disposed of her property the estate of
curtesy will immediately vest in her husband.Or the deceased
may still further determine the dispositiom of his property
by aid of a legally executed deviseorwillas it is called.
By mean- of ,tis he has the widest range of power in deter-
mining the course of title to his real property.And lastly,
he may by his failure to exercise this power,leave the dis-
position of his property entirely in the hands of the law.
Our application of these laws and powers,however,will
not be exhaustive: for in one way or another some of them apply
to every estateinterest and right in the landstenements
and heriditaments of which the deceased person was at any
time the owner.But we shall confine ourselves to particular
estates:namnely,such estates of inheritance of which he was
seized at his death and would descend to his heirs.
CHAPTE' I
LIABILITY FOR DEBT
Originally this was not an incident of freehold estates,
either during the life time of the owner or after hi-i ueath,
for any debts contr-acted by him whatever. Real property was
f~i~st made liaole tj execution for the debts of its owner
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during his life time by the statute of Edw.I ch.18 :and it
was not until the statutes 3 & 4 William 4 ch.104,that the
estates of a decedent were subject to liability for all his
debts.
In this country it is now the general rule that all
freehold estates as well as leaseholds are liable for the debtS
of a deceased ownerwhether due by matter of recordspecialty
or simple contract,and it has probably been so from Colonial
times and considered as a part ot our Coiamon law.(Kents Comm.
419 ) Not-with-standirn this,statutes have been enacted
expressly providing for the sale of a decedents real property
in this state,to pay the debts he hag contracted aurlng life
or the expenses of settling up his estate.
EXC7PTIONS.
Not all of his estate however i subject to this liability.
Though creditors and heirs may wrangle among themselves for
the possession of his realty and he have not one whit to say
conceining its disposition,yet by legislative enactment,he is
3made sure of enough grotmd wherein to rest his bones until
the final judgment dayprovided he will undertake certain
steps to bring it under the hand of the law.
That part of' the Revised -tatutes known as the Coe of
Civil Proceduce in section 1395 provides what must be done to
exempt certain designateri lands from sale by virtue of an
executionfor their use as a fa!ily or private buryinm ground.
Ist.A jortion of it must have been actually used for that
purpose.
2nri.It mast not exceed in extent one fourth of an acre.
3rd.It must not contain,at the time of its designation or
at any time afterwardsany building or structure,except
vaults or other places of deposits for the dead or mortuary
monument s.
Therefore if such a parcel of lanQ be designated accorling to
the law as expressed in the following section (I396),that
part of his estate liable for debt, will be curtailed just
so much.
HOMESTEAD.
But there is a far more important exemption,in this state
as in most others,brought about by the creation of what is
known as a "Homestead estate".In a general way this may be
said to be an interest in land,usually a life interestthat
is by statute made exempt from levy and sale under execution
4or other process when once laid clai. to by the proper parties
What this estate ig in Now York and to whom it belongs is
found in the Code of Civil Procedure (I.397ff.)
If the decedent waq a householder having a fanily,or a
married woman,the right to this excernption accrues as soon
as the property t,) be exempted has bee:_ properly designated.
This ,lay be ione (I) either by expressly stating in the con-
veyance of the designated property that it is designed to be
held a, a homestead,or(2)by a notice containing a full de-
scription off the property stating for what purpose it is
designed to be held,subscribed by the ownerproved and certi-
fied as if a deed and recorded i, the County Clerk's office
in a book kept for the purpose,known as the"homestead
exempt ion book."
If the decedent be a Lian,it continues for the benifit
of the widow and surviving children,untll the majority of the
youngest surviving child and lmtil the death of the widow.
If the decedent was a woman,it continues for the benifit
of hersurviving children,until tie majority ot' the youngest
surviving child.
Having shown to whom the exenrption belongs,it reamains
but to show what the extent of the exemption is. There must
be a lot of land with one or more buildings thereon which
must
5must be used as a residence by the owner in fee,(though the
suspension of occupation for a period not exceeding one year,
which occurs in consequence of injury to or destruction of
the dwelling house upon the premiseswill not destroy the
exemption) and shall not exceed one thousand dollars tin value
in order to be exempt from sale by virtue of an execution.
It is not exempt from liability for debts created before April
•8O,I 30,nor those wholly contracted before the designation
of the property as such an estateor for the purchase money
thereof,or from sale for the nonpaymentof taxes or assess-
ments.
So therefore if the decedent has been a householder or
married womanhas none of the above liabilities and has
properly designated property worth one thousand dollarshas
made it his residence until death and left a wife or children,
then the creditors will again have their chances lessened by
the exemption of this property from liability to satisfy
their claims. The creation of this estate was no% to defraud
creditors or protect debtors merely for their own benifitbut
to sectire to the members of the family a home beyond the
reach of creditorsthereby to prevent if possible the
necessity of their becoming public burdens.
PENSIONS,
A similar exemption to this and for the saine purpose,is that
made for the protection of pensions(Civil Code 1393) On its
face this woLld not seem to exempt lands that were purchased
with such pension monies but the case of Yates County National
Bank vs.Carpenter 119 N.Y.550 holds that the provision should
be liberally constredso that " where the receipts of a
pension can be directly traced to the purchase of the proper~y,
necessary or convenient for the support and maintatnance of
the pensioner and his familysuch property is exempt under the
provisions of the stattite.
CHARv.S.
And a decedents property may be subject to still one more
exemption,as where he leaves a will wherein certain of his
property is devised expressly charged with the payment of
his debts and funeral expenses.(Civil Code 2749) Yet here
the debts are ultimately paid ,and the only benifit derived is
that a decedent may provide for the disposition of his
property accoritn-, to his own wishes ann still satisfy
his credito's.
r.NERAL DISPOSITION.
Subject to the exemptions heretofore mentioned,the deced-
ent. estates of inheritanceboth legal and equitable,(Civil
7Code 1473 )are liable for the satisfaction of his debts.This
is by statutory enactment(Civil Code 2749)if not by the
Common law as it was adopted in this state. The proceedings
leing wholly statutory are technical and complex,and the
clrcu:Istances under which they may become necessary are
imnumerable. But there are certain general rules of order
that apply to all cascs .
At any time within three years after letters testament-
ary were first duly granted witqin the state upon the estate
of a decedent,his personal representatives or creditors may
present to the Surrogate Court from which the letters were
Issued,a written petition,duly verified,praying for a decree
directing the disposition of the decederts real property or
so much thereof as i. necessary for the payment of the debts &
The petition mugt set forth a general description of
the debts; cf a general description of the real property;the
names of' husbana or wife and of all heirs and aevisees or
those who claim under them;and the amount of personal prop-
erty which has come into the executor's or administrator's
hands ,and the application thereof.(Civil Code 2752 )
Whereuponthe Sarrogate must issue a citation to all the
parties interestedand upon the return of the citation pro-
ceed to hear the allegations and proofs of the parties.If it
then
8then appears that the proceedings have been according to law,
that the claims presented are the debts of the decedent or
reasonable charges against the estate which are not secured
by mortgage or expressly charged by will upon certain of
decedents property,or that all the personal pro perty of the
decedent which could have been applieGi to the payment of his
debtls & has been so applicd,and that it is Insuffieient for
the payient of the same,then the riecree directin6 the dis-
position of the pr jpertv will be granted.
But what particular parcels are to be disp.osed of ana
the manner of dispoition is yet to be determined. To this ena
three appraisers are appointeq bytthe Surrogatewho examino an
and appraise each parcel and statir. its value and rental
value.Thereuuon he determines whether the decree shall
direet the mortgagin,,let sin or sale of the property.The
manner in which these acts are done is explicitly defined
in the subsequent sections of this act (2766 ff.) It is with-
in the discretion of the Surrogate not only to say what dis-
position of the property shall be made but likewise what
parcels shall be disposed of and the order of their dispos-
itionunless the decedent left a will effectually devising
part or all of his real property. In which casethe several
distinct classes of parcels must be disposed of in the follow
ing
ing order.
Ist.The -pt-operLy wliich descended to 'The heirs and has
not been ,old by them.
2nri.Property '-o descended which has heen sold.
3rd.Property whic has been devises and has not been
sold h, the devi:-ee.
4th.Property so devised which has been sold.
ouch is a general oatline of tie administration of real
property so far aq it- disposition for the payment of deced-
ents debt, areis concerned.Such t ill be the general hi,
real property will take after his personalty has been ex-
hausted and debts still remain unpaid.If he shoala have made
a will therein directing that his debts be first paid,the
law ha; preceded him and demanded it. But he may by will
change the course of administration to this extentif he
requests 'hat his realty be first used for the paynt of
hiq debts and fully or partially exhauste( before thie per-
sonalty shall be usea for their payment.His right to do this
is unquestioned. Never-the-less he can not aiTeet the estate
of certain other of its Incidents known as dower and curtesy
and it will be the province of the next two chapters to
digcu;s these subjects.
CHAPTER "2" 10
T) 0 ' E R .
It is not only Impossible for a decedent to have cut off
ti" wife's interest in his real property without her consent,
(I R.S.742 I6)but the courts themselves are without the power
to so administer his property,even irn the paymnntof his debts,
as to deprive her of the estate of dower. The claims of
creditors are always subservient to those of a wife legally
entitled to dower(Higbie vs.Westlake 14 N.Y.2RI)
Dower is to be defined as "that provision which the law
makes for a widow out of the lands or tenements of her
husband".(Schouler Dom.Rel.j213) Its origin is obscure and
is universally conceded to be of great antLiquityso ancient
that neither Coke or Blackstone could trace it to its source.
It has always been a part of the Common law and has now been
incorporated into statiite in this state though abolished in
some others.(I R.S.404 I) This provides that a widow shall
be endowed of all the lana4 whereof her husband was seized
of an estate of inheritance at any time durtrg marriage.
(Schif'fer vs.Pruden 64 N.Y.47)
WHO MAY HAVE DOWER IN NEW YORK.
The requisitcs for the comsuitiation of a title of dower
are marriage,seizin of the husband,in law or in fact,and
hig, death. (Park on Dower ,W;,-Sch!ffer vs. Primen supra,
Denton vs.Na-r r 8 Barb.6I-.
IARRIAGE
There must be a lawful marriage but it is sufficlent if it
be only voidable an not void,unlesg it be dissolvea uring
the life time of the hugband.(Brower vs.Bowers I Abb.Ct.
App.Dec.214-Griffin vs. Banks 24 How.Pr.213)For the law treats
such a marriage as ;ooL f'or every purpose as if it contained
no inflrmityuntil set aside by verdict or decree.When the
marriage is5 declared void,the law treats it as void ab initio
and the woman is not entitled to any dower whateveC.But if
the husrana anti wife are simply separatea by divorce a mensa
et thoro,the wife does not lose her dower,nor on the other
hand is she entitled to recover it dturing the life of her
husband.(Tiedma on R.P.8I -Bisliop on iviarriage,Sep.& Uivorce
I678 -Day vs.West 2 Rdw.Ch.592) Nor does she lose cower in
her husband's lands where divorce a vinculo has beer granted
to her because of the husband. adultery( N.Y.95 -6P4jeXO.Z-2jjf3)
except in those lands acquired by him subsequent to the div-
orce. But by s tatate (I R.S.7,'I 3)it is provided that she
lose her dower if divorce is granted to t'he husband because
of her mscnduct.And it is held that the only misconduct
which will bar her dower is adultery;and a verdict of adul-
tery and decree of divorce must have been granted:the for-
feiture of dower not being a consequence of the offence
merely but of the judg&ment founidd thereon.(Schi~fer vs.
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Prudensuprt- Pitt v;, Pitts 52 N'.Y.593- VanCleef vs.Burns
I , N.Y.540-So that the admi.ssiorm of her adultery whether
made in court or not is insufficient to bar her dower.
But when the marriae is voir ab initio-rlot voidable merely-
dower never attaches: o ihien a woiian i arries a man already
marrteri or aivorce and not entitled to marryshe get,; no
dower.%(Price vs.Price 124 N.Y.589-Ogaen vs,Cropsey II N.Y.228-
Spicer vs.Spicer D) Abl,.Pr.N.S. II2) nor doe< the man's
divorced wife if the the divorce was for her adultery.
SEIZIN.
There muqst be seizin of the husbamd in law or in fact(for
possession is not necessary) McIntyre vs,Costello 47 Hun 2F89-
Phelps vs.Phelps 14.3 N.Y.197. This will be discussed in
connection with the kind of property in which dower exists.
DEATH OF THE HUSBAN U.
The husbanm manst lie. At Common law the physical death of
the husband was essential to complete a dower title and with-
out doubt it is now necessary in this state.The Penal Code
70 declares that a person sentenced to imprisonment for
life shall be deemed civilly dead,and in section 299 declares
that the marriage of the spouse of such a person thereafter
shall not be bigamnous.But it woula seem that this fiction of
civil death is now applie, only to the criminal side and that
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civil matters remain undisturbed by the fiction that the
owner i4 dead. For the wili of a person so civilly aead was
held not admissable to probate,as the word"decedent" as used
In sections 2655-63 of the Code oC Civil Procedure was In-
tended to be understood and applied In the ordinary sense of
the tetm as signifying one who has actually died.(In Re Zeph
50 Hun 523) And Avery vs.7verett 110 N.Y.;5I7 held that
section 708 of the Penal Code was declaratory of and restored
the Co iron law,going no further.3v the rule of the Coanuon
law civil death aid not operate as a divestiture of the estate
of the convicted person. It would therefore seem that such a
widow is not entitled to dower until the physical cieatuh of
her husband.
Until hig death thiq right oC dower Is said to be
inchoate. But we shall not concern ourselves with the nature
of dower at this stage,for the htsband is already dead ana
the right has become consimnate.
ITN WHAT PROPERTY.
It will be noticed fro ,!i the statute that dower extends
*to all lands whereof the husba':d was seized at any time,
during marriagew.This would cover all lands that he ha ais-
posed of before death;but it is not with these that wearw
are concerned. So that our present topic i:A confined to the
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effect of the wife's present right ,ipon- lands of' which the
husband died seized of an estate of' inherita c only.
The question a- to what property iq su ject to dwwer is,
In a general way easily disposea of. Arst All tch
estates as are free from incumbrance; secona,those incunbered.
UNINCUMBERED TZ- TAT'7S.
These may be held by hiM solely or ac tenant ir common.(Smlnh
vq.iS,,.1th 'S Lans.313-Wilkinsor vs.Parish 3 Paige 653- Totten
vs. Stuyvesant 3 Frri. Ch.500-Ch trch vs. Churrh 3 Sanaf.Ch.434-
!'ord vs,.napp 102 N.Y.I35 -Jouraan vs.Haran I17 14.Y.626) but
they muqt be estates in fee simple or i' fee qualified by
condition,limitatiorn or conditional limitation.
As to those in fee simple sh' will have a life estate but h
her estate in those qualified is subject to be determined by
the termination of the estate of which her husbana was seizea,
for she takes no better estate thar he haa-with one exception:
If the estate be determinable under a power of appointment,
dower ceases if' the power is exercised ,otherwise not.(Hawley
vs,James 5 -aige 318) If thu, estate be conditional aria be
determined by' entrj For forfeiture upon breach of condition,
dower ,i destroyea.(qreen vs.Reynolds 5-- State '<ep. 46-
Beardsley vs.Beardslev 5 Barb.324- Milledg vs. Lamior 4
Desuu 637). I' the estate be determinable uinder collateral
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limitations, dower is deterrminea when the liiAtin- event hap-
pen..(Moriarta vs.ic1Rea 15 Hutn 5(,4) But wheter an estate
deteryinrable under a conditioral limitation or by executory
devise continties subject to dower after it is determir-ed,is
disutited though the weight of opinion seems to be that it does.
go a devisee,subject to an executor'- power of sale,h...s a
vested estate of which or his death after the testator's
death and before the exercise of a power of sale;ana his
widow is entitled to dower:aia OI a qubsequent exercise of the
power o ' sale,the ,,idow is entitled to share in the distribu-
tion of the proceeds.Sinpsor.'s Etate 15 Abb.Pr.N.S.23O)
Pstates tail were formerly subject to dower but they have
been abolished in New York or other provision made for them
in case of valid limitatiors.I 3 5 so that the (quies-
tion as to dower in these estates does not arise in this sta'e-
71it if the decedentd property be situated outside of New
York,it may attach as all states have not abolished estates
tail. Hiitchin'- Williams R.P.I2I.
But the wiciow is not always obliged to take dower out of
these lands alreaay mentioned of which her husband diea
seized if they have been Rxahango-received in exchange for
other lan(i during marriage.I R.S.C- S "If husband seizc
of an eqtate of inheritance in landsexchanges them for
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other lands.his widow shall not have aower in them bothbut
qhall make her election to be endowed of the lands given,or of
those taken in exchange:and if such election be not evinced
by the commencementof proceedings to recover her dower of
the lands given i-n exchange,within one year after the death
of her husbandshe shall be deemed to have elected to take
her dower out of the lands receives in exchange".This choice
came up in the case of Wilcox vs.Randal 7 Barb.633.
INCTMBERED ESTATES.
We will next take up such estates of inheritances as are riot
free froin incumbrances,namnely equitablejLortgage aia
partnership property
RUITABTT:.
At Communon law the wiaow was not entitled to dower in lands
in which her husband was seized of a mere equitable estate
or interest during coverture or at the time of his death.
But -he legislature of this state and many others has in the
Code of Civil Procedure section 1473,adopted the principle
of gibing to the widow her equitable dower in the descendible
equitable interests of her husband of' which he dies seized.
oo in the cafe f, a contract for the purchase of lands,where
the husband dies seized of an inheritable interest in the
premises,before the conveyance of the legal estate has been
7giventhe right of the widow to equitable dower therein sub-
ject to the lien of the vendor for the unuald purchase money,
is distinctly recognized. (Hawley vs,JaTies,supra-Church vs.
Churchsupra-Hicks vs.Stebbins 3 Lans.39- McCattee vs.Teller
2 Paige 5II-Johnson vs.Thomas 2 Paige 377) But this principle
extends only to those cases in which the equitable interest
of the husband in his trust property continues down to his
death so as to be inheritable by his heirs and he iumt be in
a situation at '-us death to enforce specific performance of
the contract or obtain a legal title by a decree in equity.
Rut the widow is not entitlea to dower in lands of which
her husband was a mere trustee.(Territt vs,Crombie 6 Lans.82-
Co ler vs. Clark 5 Eqri.Ch.428-Cooper vs.Whitney 5 Hill 977)
He must be benificially seized of the properly in law or In
equity. So a transitory seizin for a moment as a mere conduit
is not sufficient to -ive dower.(Tabele vs.Tabele I John.
Ch.45-Cunningham vs.Knight I Barb. 399-Mvayburry vs.Brier:
15 Pet.2I). This leads to the subject of dower in
MORTGAGEDI P PERTY;
as where ,in the last above situation a husband taken a
conveyance in fee and at the same time mortgages the land
back to the grantor or to a third person to secure the pur-
chase money,in whole or in part,aower cannot be claimed as
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against rights under the mortgage.(Mayburry vs.Brien,supra
Xittle vs.VanDyke I Sandf.Ch.76-Brackett vs.Baum 50 i.Y.8)
But statutes provide that as against every one but the
mortgagee and those claiming under him,shall have dower in all
lands so purchasea during marriage and iniediately mortgaged
to pay the purchase moriey.(I R.S.741 5) And the same pro-
vision for dower is made in lands mortgaged at any time
before marriage whether for purchase noney or not.(Idewu, 4 -
Stow vsSwift 15 John.458)And where In such case"tqe mort-
gagee or those claiming inder him shall after the death of
her husband,caused the mortgaged land to be soldeither under
a power of sale contained in the mortgageor by virtue of a
decree of' a court of eqity,ana any stlrplus shall remain
after the payment of the monies due on such mortgage anci the
costs and charges of the salesuch widow shall nevertheless be
ertitled to the interest or income of the one third part of
such sirplusfor her life as her dower.(Iaem 6)
The widow Is also entitled to dower in an equity of
redemption therein existing at the death of her husbana.
(Swaine vs.Perrre 5 John.Ch.492-Mills vs.VanVoorhis 20 N.Y.
412- Titas vs.Nelson 5 John.452-)although not at Commor law
Maburry vs.Briensupra;as well where the mortgage was exe-
cuted before the marriage by her husband solely,as after,whon
executed
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executed jointly as a:,ainst every person except the mortgagee
and those claiming under htin.(Bell vs.Mayor 10 Paige 49)
Consequentlj we may draw three general rules:That the
right of dower is subject to the mortgage (I) when the mort-
gage was given before marriage,(2) when given after marriage
for the purchase money of the premises,(3) and when given
after marriage and the wife united in the conveyance. In
these cages if the land was sold for the satisfaction of the
mortgage,she would have dower in the surplus only.(Coles vs.
Coles 15 John.3I9-Titus vs.Tltus 5 John.Ch.452-Swaine vs.
Perrine,supra) In all other cases she has dower without
regard to the mortgage.
PARTNERSHIP ESTATES.
It is now a well settled doctrine in this state that
partnership real estate isso far as the partnership is
concernedto be regarded as personalty until the winding u4p
of the firm business and the adjustment of partnership
accounts. But this is the extent of the equitable conversion,
and as soon as the partnership business has been settled up,
the property is again considered a, realty.So estates held
by the partnership for partnership purposes are subject to do
dower although the dower right is subordinate to the demands
that may be made by partnership creditors against the part-
ners
20
nership.Thit it is not subordinate to the claims of' the part-
ner's individual creditors.(2 Edw.Ch.2f- !i t.123- 5 Paige 451
50 N.Y.Super.Ct.275- 2 Sandf.Ch.325- 5 id.669- 10 Misc.428-
85 Hun 482- 2 Barb.Ch.165- II Barb.43- 52 id.349-47 N.Y.656-
49 N.Y.I03- 64 N.Y.47I) But in order that the claunL of
creditors may take precedence of the widow's dower in respect
to lands held by two or more persons,the land m ist be in
thruth partnership p,)Perty because it is possible for part-
ners to hold as tenants Ir. common if they have expressly
agreed that they shall hold their lands in that manner.In
which case the widow takes 'ier (iower free from the claims
of creditors.
(As to what is partnership real estate-see Eng.& Ai;,.Ency.
of Lawvol.I7 p.944-Collnb v-.Read,24 N.Y.505)
9ut partners may effect a complete equitable conversion
of such property i. to personalty by aggeement to that effect,
and thus cut off a wiaow's dower,but the agreement must be
clear and explicit.(Collumb vs.Readsupra) In the absence of
this agreement however as soon as the purposes of the equit-
able conversion have been accomplished,the widow is entiticd
to dower in her husband's share of the property,and if it
shall have been sold in the settlement of the partnership.
her right attaches to the suri-lus funas if there be any.
Averill vs. Toack 6 Barb '7o
ROW BARRED.
It Is safe to say that the husbanaafter he has once become
seized of land,cannot of his own act bar the wifes right of
dower(I R.S.r,42 16)although he may avoid the inconvenience
of dower by taking such title In himself that the requisites
of dower will not exist. But if love rule the match-not money-
the man may pursuade his intended wife to make a legal
jointure. At Common law no provision or settlement made by
a man before his marriage in favor of' his future wife,could
bar her dower-un til the statute of Uses.This statute was
recognized In this state as part of the Conmor law un til a
special statute was enacted especially providing for both
legal and equitable jointure.(I R.S.r41 9-11)
TJGAL JOINTURE.
"Whenever an estate in lands shall be conveyed to a person
and his intended wifeor to such intendea wife alone or to
any person in trust for such wife alone for the purpose of
creating a jointure for such intended wife,and with her
assent,such jointure shall be a bar to any right or claim of
dower of such wife In lands of her husband."
Or any pecuniary provision that shall be made for the
benifit of the intended wife as above.shall,if assented to,
also bar her right of dower.
A legal
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A legal jointure is such a provision,as under the statu4te of
Uses or other statute,o' itself bars dower;while an equitable
Jointure is such ,. provision as requires the widow to choose
between it and dower. Little difficulty arises as to legal
3olnture becanre the wife's assent to the agreement disposes
of the perplexing problem as to whether or not the provision
is made in lieu of dower.If then the agreement is made
acording to statute,is made before inarriage(Crain vs,Cavana,
M Barb.410- Townsend vs.Townsend 2 Sandf.Ch.711) and to take
ef'ect in posiession or profit irmediately after the death
of her husbandto endure at least for her life,(McCart6 vs.
Teller,supra)ana expressly made in satisfaction of' her whole
dower(Swaine vs.Perrine)is a reasonable and competent pro-
vision for the wife's livilihood-not a mere nominal provision-
(rrrahain v z.Graham 67 Hun ,329-428) then her dower right is
certainly barred. ;uch an arnte-nuptual contract will alwa:ys
be sustained when fairly made,yet,from the confidential
relations of the partiesit will be regarded with the most
rigid scrutiny.(Pierce vs. Pterce 71 !.".26- and where marriage
Is the sole consideration,the contract will not be sustainea.
graham vs.rGraham supra).
VTT'-AB3,7 JOTNTTRE.
The difficulty lie, in qllitable jointure-not as to the suf-
ficiencq of the provision in lieu of' qowoc oecause the offer
of the husbar ha; not yet been accepted-but in determining
whether the provision was really made in lieu of dower or
in addItion thereto. For if it is made in liet of dower,the
widow must elect whether she will accept it or demand her
dowrr;and if In addition theretoshe is not bound to make ar,
election but demand both dower and devise.
The New York statute in reference to eq titable jointure
I R.S.741 TP-5 says,"T -' before coverturebut without her
assent or if after coverture,lands shall be given or assurea
for the jointure of a wife or a pecuniary provision be made
for her in lieu of dowershe shall make her election whether
she will take such jointure or pecuniary provisionor whether
she will be endowed of the lands of her husband but she will
not be entitled to both".
Orif lands be devised to a woman or a pecuniary provision
be made for her by will in lieu of dower" she must also
make her election.And " where entitled to an election she
shall be deemea to have ma4 elected to take such jointure,
devise or other pecuniary provision,unless within one year
afier the death of her husband she sqall enter upon the lands
to be assigned to her for dower or coirmxence proceedings for
the recovery or assignment thereof."
First as to the provisions t.ade in lieu of dower by deed.
She is then put to her electionand if after the husband's
death she accepts such a provisionshe bars herself of dower.
2 Rdw.Ch.592-- 86 Barb.410- 2 Sandf.Ch.711) But if she has ,
received such provisions during his life ana spent or wasted
it,she may taie dower ag If it hadnot been made -for husband
ana wife may not so contract with each other.(Carson vs.
Murray,3 Paige 483-) In order to estop her,it is necessary
that she should have enjoyed the provision ir part at least
after her husbands death.(Townsend vsTownsend,sipra- Jones
vs,Powell 6 John.Ch.I94) So a wife has been estopped from
demanding dower where,during the life of her husband who was
an adjudged lunatic,she has made an agreerent with a connittee
appointed to look after his estate,whereby she was to receive
certain pecuniary aid in lieu of dower at onoe,and she had
cortn~Med to accept it after her husband's death. Jones vs.
Fleming 104 N.Y.4IS- Price vs.Pricesupra 124 N.Y.600)
As to the sufficiencp of the provision to bar dower where
made by deea,the same rules apply here as in the case of
testamentary provisions of this nature (see below).
The statute being so clear ard explicit as to the necess-
Ity of her making an election between dowee and these
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Provisions by wil or deed ,we will content ourselves prin-
aipally in determining what is required to be present in
these provisions in order to force her to this election.
It is not-as so often stated -absolttely necessary that
the testamentary provision or deed is expressly declared to
be In lieu of dower. But the intention of the testator that
It was meant to be such,must appear upon the face of the will
either expressli or by necessary implication.(Adsit vs.Adsit
I John.C h.448- Jackson vs.Churehill 7 Cowen 2s7- In Re Smith
I Misc.269- Betts vs.Betts . Abb.N.C.317- Smith vs.Kniskern
4 John.Ch.9- Wood vs.Wood 5 Paige 596- Fuller vs.Yates
R id.325- Sandford vs.Jackson I id.266-I gandf.Ch.324-
nordon vs.Stephens 2 Hill 46- Tobias vs.Ketchium 32 N.Y.319)
Asche vs.Asche 113 N.Y.232) In fact the cases are numerous
and uniform in holding that in order to compel the widow to
elect between her dower ard the provision in her favor con-
tained in the will of her husbandthe will must either
expressly declare the provisions to be in lieu of dower-or
its terms must be such as to show an intention on the part
of the testator to exclude that right."The inquiry'sad
Chancellr Xent in Adsit v':.Adsitsupra'is,whether suIch an in-
tention in the testator is to be collected by clear and
manifest implication from the provisions of the will To
enable us to deduce suich an implieri intentionthe claim of
dower must be inconsistent with the will and repugnant to
its dispositions or some of them.In fact it mast disturb or
disappoint the will".
Every provision must satisfy this test. If there be any
serious doubt as to whether it was made in lieu of dower or
not,the presumption is that it is not in lieu o-P dower but
cumulative and in addition to dower.(Konvalinka vs.Schlegel
104 N.Y.125- Asche vs.Aschesupra) R ut the widow on the death
of her husbana is at once charged with the duty of inform-
ing herself whether she must make the election.(Akin vs.
Kellogg 119 N.Y.441) For if the provision proves to have
beena intended to be in lieu of dower,she is deemed to have
accepted it as such,unless within one year she has made the
election provided for by statute.
The effect of electing this provision in lieu of cower
is to make her a purchaser thereof for valuable consideration.
The reason upon which this rule is foundea isin Isenhart vs.
1rown,I Edw,Ch.411,stated to be"the price put by the testa-
tor himself upon the right of election and which she is at
liberty to accept or refuse.Her relinquishment of dower forms
a valuable consideration for the testamentary gifts.ln this
point of view she becomes the purchaser of the property left
27
to her by will" If it were a devise her rights are inferior
to those of the' husband's creditors(Leavenworth vs.Cooney
4A Barb.570- William4on vg.Williamson 6 Paige 298) though
superior to those of other devisees ,anid will not abate with
them. (Isenhart vs. Brown, supra)
Because of this,where the whole interest in lands is
devised to her by will,the question aA to whether she takes
In lieu of dower or as dower and devise-one third interest
as dower and two thirds in addition theretoor all in lieu of
doweris of much importance to her If there are creditors.
For if she takes all in liei of dower the creditors may reach
all i- the satisfaction of their claims-ana if she takes part
as dower it will be out of their reach. For want )f clear
exoresgion of hi intention that she shoAld take the whole
property by virtue of thp will and not partly under the
title of qower,it would secia that she may elect to take
lands so devised to her both Linder the will and her title of
endowment-the latter free from the clairas of creditors.
This question arose under somewhat dif'ferent circumstances
in the case of Church vs.Bull 2 Denio 430,where a testator
devIqed all his real an personal estate to his wife auriLg
life or so long aq s m shotl( remair his wicow,but he did
r.ot state in hi- wiIl that he intended this provision for
hiM wife to be in lieu of' dower in his real estate after the
determination of such provision by her marriage.The wife
having survived the husband entered and occupied under the
will for several years and then married a second hushand. It
was held that she was entitlea to dowev after she had
married.(see also Lewis vs.Smith II Barb.152- Sandford vs.
Jackson,s lpra)
But if' the rivise was expressly stated to be in lieu of
dower,even though it limited upon widowhood,and -he accepted
it,her dower is barred thereby.For some ti,-ae there was doubt
upon this point but it is now the accepted doctrine tfrIat the
provision is sufficient,the limitation is valid and will
operate to bar dower as it was intended to do.Some cases
hold that a devise "durante viduitatels so far inconsistent
with the enjoyment of dower as to furnish prima facie evi-
dence of an intention to exclude that right.But the New York
courts hold that no such inference is permissible and that
a devise auring widowhood does not cut off dower upon
subsequent warriage,anless the testator expressly declares
that the provision is in lieu of dower and she accepts it
as such.
As to her election we have already seen that it must
be made within one year after her husband's aniath,and unless
she shall have qone so,the law chooses for her.The statute
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applies wheter she knew of the provision ir lieu of dower
or Mot,unless in case of fraudulent concealment.(Palmer vs.
Voorhis .35 Barb.4"9.
But under certain circumstances she is not bound by her
eleOtion-a ,for instance.if" she made It under the supposition
that the es;tate devised to and accepted by her was free from
lien or incumbrance when such is not -he fact.Such will be the
case whenever the election is made under mistake an in
ignorance of the real state of the property,and she will be
entitled to relief in equity.(Adsit vs.Adsit,supra)
The rule Is the same where by wears of fraud a wiriow is
induced to make an election contrary to her true interest.;
and different frou, what she woalri otherwise have aone.
Or in case part of the provision mraae by the testator in
lieix of dower is declared void,the widow is not bouna by a
previous election to receive such provisions,though she may
accept the residue in lieu.ot' her dower.(qone vs.VanSchaick
P Paige 221- Matiric' v- .Nlaurice I Lans.348)
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Corresponding to the estate of dower created by opera-
tion of law in favor of the wife is the estate for life
created by law in favor of the husbana known as tenancy by
the curtesy. To entitle a husband to this estate the corres-
ponding requisites of dower,namely:legal marriage,setzin
and death of the spouse,are necessary. B3ut in addition thereto
there must also have been Issue born alive capable of Inherit-
ing the estate.
The same rules as to the sufficiency of the marriage
FprI;y in curtesy a,- in dower and divorce avinculo against
the husband bars the estate.(Renwick vs.Renwick 10 Paige 420)
The rules as to seizin and the rights thereon attaching
are somewhat different. The husband is entitled to curtesy
in all estates of inheritancelegal and equltable,of which she
was seized at her death and were not disposed of by wil-,with
these exceptions.If the estate of the wife be one upon con-
dition or upon limitation the husband_ curtesy is defeated.
(Washburne R.P.I68-I70) Tut by a refinement of &ts-inction
if the estate be upon conditional limitation,the estate still
exists un affectea by the happening of the contingency by
which it was determined.(Hatfield vs.Sneden 54 N.Y.285-
Grant vs.Townsend 2 Hill 554)
W1
There are also exoeptions to the rule that thi, husband is
entitled to curtesy in the wife's equitable estates.Tendcny
by the curtosy is one of the incidents of' a legal estate of
inheritanceana in-as-much a s the Incidents of su;h an
estate depend not upon the intentions of the grantorbut are
engrafted upon It by the lawit Is beyond the power of a
testator in bestoying the legal title to property upon a
female devisee to deprive her husband of his curtesy by
express restrirtions. But it seems that this may be done in
the case of the settlenent of an equitable interest upon her
by special provisions in *he Instrument.(Acair vs.bott 5 Hill
tP2- Dunscomb vs.Dunscomb I John.Ch.508) Unless such provi-
sions are made however the husband has curtesy in her equit-
able property.
The principle difference between the *o estates of
dower and curtesy is that the former is but a life interest
in one third of the estates in which the right exists,while c
curtesy is a life interest in all of such property.
In curtesy as in dower actual death of the spouse is
birth
necessary to complete the estate. After the of the chila
the husband's title to the curtesy becomes possible and the
curtesy is then inchoate,but after the death of the wife,
curtesy becomes complete and is then constinriate.3tit the estate
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of' curtegy aq it exists in New York sate~whtle r oL expressly
abolishea,has been seriously modified by statutes known as the
"Married Womefl'sAct"
The -irst Married Wonw's Act passed in IS48(L 148 ch.
200)for the more effectual protection of the property of
marrIea women proVided that the real and personal property
of any female who is marriea or may hereafter marry should not
be subject to the disposal of her husband or liable for his
debts but should be her sole and separate property. The
next one in the f&llowing year(L 1849 )gave her sole power
of dispositton by will or deed.
It was held at first that these statutes entirely
abrogated the existence of any prospective tenancy by the
ourtesy(Billings vs.Baker 28 Barb 343)That in as much as the
statute made a married woman's property for her sole and
separate use there coild be no curtesy initiate,that her
estates were in the same condition now as at Connon law where
she was allowed to hold sole and separate estatesset aside
in equiitp,independent of her husband and free from his right
of rurtesy;aid further,that the legislature so Intended.
It was argued by Lamont.J.in Wirme's case(I Lans.508,over-
ruled ir. 2 id.21)that there was no difference between
curtesy initiate and curtesy consintnate ,because curtesy
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initiate could be sold on execution for the husband's debts
and the purchasel, would hold the estate riuring the life of
the husband though he "hou ld survive the wife.And that as
he now had no interest ir the wife's l:-rds which could be
sold,he would not have any upon her death. In the case of
Thurber vsTownsenq 22 N.Y.517,it was contended by the defena-
ant,who held the plaintiff's land irder a lease from her
husband,that the ha7-:b rd by his marriage and the birth of
issue acquired an estate Tby the curtesy in the land of his
wife which could not be destroyed by the legislature through
these or any other statutes-but the Court hela otherwise and
affirmed the decisions abolishirg dower.
Buht this construction of the statute has been over-rulea
by the case of Hatfield vs.Sneden 54 N.Y.280 ard the contrary
doctrine establishen that curtesy does still exist in this
state. In as much a, tie statute deprives the husban-a of
all control over his wife's estate and gives to her the sole
power of disposition,the court concedes that the early cases
were correct in declaring that the legislatUre had
intended to deprive the husbamxi of curtesy initiate,bu. wheth-
er they intended so or tot,such is the fact for by express
words they have withdrawn all the incidents of' curtesy
initiate
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initiate, BUt to s y that the le_;.ilatire intende to
bar the husb- n; of his curt(sy where the wife dies inte.state
and without having conveyed her estate;and that it intended
the heirs of the wife '. '-iled t, ke the estate intiediately
upon her deceace rather than her husband daring his life-
this would be an unreasonable inference .Such a construction
would be in utter disregard of the rule that the Coiimmoh law
i* not to be changed by statute any further than a fair con-
struction of the %tatute requires and that a change or repeal
by implication is not favored.
Consequently the statute as now applied affects only
such property as the wife has disposed of in her life time
by deed or by will. So where a married woman possessed of
a separate estate without having made any disposition of it
in her life time by dee-i or by way of testamentary appoint-
ment,the title thereto vests in her husband by operation of
law without any formalities on his part. But he estate -
contingent a- it is upon the the intestacy of the wife and her
seizin at death in addition to the usual requisites of
curtesy-is one of great uncertainty,for it has no existence
whatever until these contingencies occur.
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In Vie preceding chapter-; we have treated of the possi-
ble disposition of a deceased person's real property through
its administration for the payment of his debts;throughthe
estates of dower and curtesy.These are dispositions made b y
operation of law ani we have yet to treat of its disposition
as governed by the individual will of the deceased owner.
The right to dispose of property in this wayner was
first given by the statute of Wills and is too well known
to require any further reference.It is not my purpos(e to
treat of theentire subject of the law of willsbut shall
touch merely upon the scope of' a will :considering that the
testator had testamentary capacity and that he properly
executed the will. By statute(I R.q.56 I-3)all persons except
idiots persons of unsound mind and ii-fants may devise their
real estate by a last will and testament if it be duly exe-
cuted -and every estate and interest in real property may be
so devised- and it is further provided that such devise may
be made to every person capable of holding real estate. I
shall therefore endeavor to find the imitatRons to this
rule that any competent person may dispose of his real estate
to wiom anrL in the manner he pleases,by first treating of
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those persons whom he cannot make benificiaries and secona,
Of those provisions he cannot make because they are illegal
or against public policy,irrespective of the capacity ,v
the ber.ificiaries.
1rlo n ot be benificiaries.
The holding of' land in this country by aliens has always
been looked upon with disP~for.'Mhether this is the result
of race prejudice or whether it iq because of certain notions
that it would endanger our safety does not affect the situa-
tion. ut the fact that au Corzron law aliem; could take and ho
hold lands by purchaseand that their title so acquired was
goo4 as against the state leads me to believe that the
latter reason is the cause of the disability.It was held in
the case of Wright vs.Saddler 20 N.Y.320 that this general
rule of the Common law was not changed by the Revised Statutes
except in the single instance provided in the statute of Will,;
Thi statute provides that every devise to a person who at
the time fo the death of the "estgtorshall be an alien rnot
authortxed by statute to hold real estate shall be void. The
interest so devised shall descend to the heirs of the
testator;If there be such heirs competent to take it shall
pass under his will to the residuary legatees or devisees
therein namea if any there be competent to take Auch interest.'
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P, R. .57 4) A,. to the authorization of alienm; to hold sach lands,
it provided that any alien wrho has come or may hereafter come. into
the United qtates may make a deposition or affirmation in writ-
ing before any officer authorized to take the proof of deeds to be
recordedthat he is a resident oC and always intendes to reside
In the Unitea States and to become a citizen thereof as soon as
he can become naturalized and that he has takeni such incipient
measures as the law- require to enable him to obtain naturaliza-
tion.(Laws 1834 ch.272)
"Any alien who shall make And file such depositiona shall there-
upon be authorized anti enables to take and hold lands ard real
estate of any kind whatever to him,hi, heirs ard assigns forever
and may during ;ix years thereafter sellass In,mortgage,.evise arra
disL.oqe of the saiie in any manner as he might do if he were a na
native of this state or of the Unites States except that no such
alien shall have power to lease or demise any real estate which
he may take or hold by virtue of this provision,until he becomes
naturalixed" (idem)
And by the lawq of Iq45 ch.115 I any alien resident of this
state to whom any lands haee been or may hereafter be d vised be-
fore the making and filing of such deposition as heretofore pro-
vided may on making and filing such deposition hold the real e-tate
devised to such alien in the same manner and with like effect a:;
if
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if such alien at the time of such devise was a citizen of the
United States.
And it was further provided that this act should not affect
the right of the state to escheat before the filing of such
deposition but that all prodeedings to recover lands held
by a resident alien,by reason of his alienage should be
suspended upon his filing the aforementioned deposition.
These are the substantial provisions relating to this
subject uP to 1893.
I was held in the case of Hall vs.Hall 81 N.Y.I30
that the statute(I R.S.57 4)changed the Connon law in two
respeots.First,that it deprived an alien devisee of the right
to take and hold by devise until he performs certain require-
ments:Second,it modlfied the rule that the state might recover
lands devised to an alien and hold them against all the
worldnow makinr. them descendible to the heirs of the testator
if there were any competent to take and if there were none,
passing them to the testators residuary Revisees.
Then in turn it was held that this statute declaring a
devige to one who,at the time of the testater's death,was an
alien to be void was itself modified by the act of chap.115
of the laws of 1845 making provisions whereby an alien could
La' e
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take lands by devise so that a resident alien devisee of a
citizen takes,upon acceptance of' the devise.,a conaitimnal
title,absolute as against the heirs of the testator but
defeasible by the state until he complies with the conditions
aq to aliens.
Consequently the situation is that if an alien devisee has
not or does not file the deposition required within two
years (L.I857 576 I)the devise is void and goes to the heirs-
that if' he does file the deposition the devise is absolute
a, against the heirsbut if he fails to become naturalized
within six yearsthe estate may escheat to the state.
There has been one more modification 66 the qti-tLL"t
owing to ite verbal construction which was pr'obably not
-,ithin the intention of the legislattire.The statute reads
that every devise to a person who"at the ;irme of the testators
death"shall be an alien and has therefore been held not to
apply to those who are born aliens after the testators death.
Therefore where a testator devised land- to his daughter
for life and to her issuze in feeanca sheafter his death,
marrte an allerit was held that this took the estate under
the devise as against the testators heirs at law,subject to
the escheat of the governirent.(Wads-vorth vS.etlrrav 16 Barb.6(I
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Likewise where a testator devised land for life to a citizern
wife of an alien with remdjinder over to the alien husband for
life and remainder to her ilsue then living ana eight alien
alien children of the citizen wife were living at her death,
four of whom were born after the testators death;It was held
that these last four were not incapacitated from taking the
propertythough aliens.(Van Cortland vs.Laidley 59 Hun 161)
But the las of 1893 ch.207 modifies the entire system as
we have traced itThiq provides that any person wvho would
otherwise answer to the description of heir or devisee of
a personwho at the time of his deathwas a citizen of the
United States shall be entitled to take property by devise
or otherwise as if he were a citizen,not-with-stanaing that
he himself was an alien. There has been no judicial inter-
pretation of this ,tttute or review of its effect tapon
previous statutes,but it would now seem that both resident an
non-resident aliens may now take property by devise from
citizens of the Lnited States, althotg they are still
precluded from takinr by devise from aliens having real
estate here.
Alien women however are not subject to any restrictions
whatever a, to the taking of lands by aevise if they be
residents of this state.Thcy are made capable of taking by
devise under tbe '4,ll of her husband or any person capable
of devisint real estate,as i- she viere a citizen of the
4'
United States arid have the same power of disposition thereof.
(T,..1845 ch.11I5
And by o, further statute (L.I72 ch.120 I)the children
of a female citizen and an alien may take by devise from their
motherwhether living in this or in any other country.And
it is held tht neither the marriage of a female citizen with
an alien husband nor her rf'-idence in a foreign couintry will
make her become an -lien Mo as to prevent her taking by
devise or-.. _hr children taking by devise from her.(Schanks
vs.upont 3 Peters 212- Beck vs..MeGillis 9 Barb.35.
And there is still one other modificatior_ of the rule
that aliens may not uake by devise, s VOrought about by the
treaties of the United State- with foreign countries;for
every such treaty is superior to the Constitution and laws
of any individual state.For instanceoumder a treaty with Great
Britain,1794,a British stbject holding lan.s within the
United States was empowered to devise them to an alien and
it wa held that this pover to devise without restriction
necessarily implied a corresponding ability in the devisee to
take and hold(Watson vs.)onnell 28 Barb.653. )
Not-with-standing these provisions making the alien more
or less incapable to receive the legal title to land by
devise,the alien may receive the benifit therefrom if it be
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made in trust to persons who are citizens, an while the alien
receives the in come of the lands so devised he takes Lo
legal interest in the lands. So where the will of' M.directed
her executors to pay to Ban alien,during his life all the
income derived from her estates save as specifiec,with full
power to sell and convey the same,a 'ievise to the executors
in trust was implied and hela valtd.(Marx vs;.Glynn 88 N.Y.358)
CORPORATIONS.
Corpowations from their very nature can have only such powers
and capacities as are granted in their charters or enabling
acts.It is therefore impossible for a corporation to take by
devise under a will unless it has been granted this power
by legislative enactment.The power t o"take and hola"lands
might well imply the right to take by devise in the absence
of' further restrictions.But it is distinctly provided that a
corporation shall not take by devise unless expressly enablea
by its charter or by statutes.(2 R.S.57 4)In N.Y.this power
is found in the general corporation lawsection IIwhich
provides that every corporation as such has power"to acquire
by grant,glif'tpurchase,devise and bequest-to hold and dispose
of such property as the purposes of the corporation shall
requiresubject to such limitations as may be prescribed by
law"
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'Rit where a corporation ii- orranizeri under a special charter
it i controlled by the -provisions thered and if the power
to take by devise iq rot expressly iven,it jM. not a capable
devisee. qo a provision in t charter conf'errir.g a right to
take by 'purchase"is held rot to include the right to take
by rievie.(MvYcCartee v;.Orphan AsylLll 9 Cow.437) And so of
a charter declaring the corporatlon to be capable of'"takIng,
pircha~rin,holiir -,na conveytni real estate". (Theolosical
7em.vs.Child;. 4 Paige 419- Downing vs.Niarshall 23 N.Y.366)
'9NE, VOTNT ASSOCIATIONW &c.
Tr the case of benevolent associations and corporations
devises tb them have been limited in two ways.Firstthe gen-
eral nor, oration law provides that all such coriorations not
havirg a capital stock may take and hold property to the
amount of but not exceeding A3000000.The burder of this law
naq fallen heavily upon the corporation of' Cornell University.
Property was devised to this corporation by the will of
Mrs.Jennie McGraw Fiske which the Court of' Appeals held (In
Re Mc(raw 66 N.Y.I66)it was not capable of taking,having
already the amount of" property which by its charter it was
entitled to hold. The second limitation made in partial
amendiment to the laws of [q%48 ch.3I', provides that no person
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having a husbsndwife,shild or parent shall by his or her
last will devise or bequeath to any benevolentcharitable,
lIterary,scientificreligious or missionary societyassocla-
tion or oorporatlonin trust or otherwisemore than one half
of his or her estate af'ter the payment of his or her debts-
and such devise shall be valid to the extent of one alf'
aftd no more.(L.f860 Gh.360)
And it was hel in McCat'bee vs.Orphan AsylUmU,supra,aI1c
in Stephenson vs.Orphan Asylum 92 N.Y.4.3 that the section
oe the laws of' 1848 ch.319 providing that every will contain
Ing such bequest or devise shall be executed at least two
months before the death of the testator applies to this act,
and is not confined to cases where the testator left a wife
child,husband or parent.
Then by the law'; of' I88Ich.641 these acts of' 1848 and 1860
are qo amended that all devises and bequesta to these corpora-
tions &c shall be iiiiited to the amount of A2O00O0,as well
as not more than one half of' testators property. (Wardlow vs.
Rome for Incurables 4 Dem.473)
'3a this retriction declaring invalid a devise or bequest
to a benevolent corporation made less than two months before
the testators deathapplies exclusively t:, corporations
formed under the act of IF4 i,ani there is no pablic policy
established
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which authorizes the enforceirtent of that limitation against
a foreign corporation which is authorized to take property by
devi e or bequest free from a similar Jtrimtation in the state
of its areation.(Hollis vs.)Urew Theo. ,emij.95 N.Y.1cO) So
also foreign corporattons, may take such property uider wills
executed by persons aomiciled in this state as they are
empowered to acqtlir< by the laws of' the state of" their
creation,even though they could not take it if Ircorporatea
utnder the law, of this state.(Riley vs.Oiggs 2 Dem..IR4)
It would therefore qeeni that foreign corporations are riot
controlled by the laws of this state just mientionea but have
their capacity fixed entirely by theic own charters or enab-
linig acts aria the laws of tleir own state.
In addtion to laws empowering all t~ee corporations to take
by devise are enabling acts for special kinds of corporat.ea
and unincornora.eri associations.
Attorney's Aqsociations- L.IAR7 ch.I7 7
gociety for Prevention of Cruely to Animals T,.I c.490
13uildinr & Toan Ass'n Ir.TI c.351 I0
Churh Ce, etery Asi'n ri8I c.52I j
Private Cem' A,--;In -[;47 c.I3 I- as atridea by IR74 c.245
ard ;I R8 c.464
!ocietv f'or Preveiit or of Cruelty to Childre JR75 c.I30 2
Voltin~teer Fiv Comnkarics IR7., c.: 7 5
W i 'L l a e I$ it l P 7 C .3 1 P ,  *
Library Co) Atr~ie- I Y 5, 39 5 12 : t1-' e.1I3
M.usical Coll-e- I75 c.T6 3
Political Clubs [ a6 c.236 7
Relligious Socie;'es I85 c.79 3 a, am'deriJJ75 c.4-3
q-cial Socleties i65 c.36q 6 ;:Tq7 c.2b7  7
7olaer's tioriiiert AJ9'r 3 166 c.t - as am'dea I-a c.299
SUBSCRIBING WIT14ES37.
In this a, t- rearly all ;tates provisions are made
whereby sub>scribing --it,,esses are precluaed from taking by
devise under a vill,the execution of which It is their
bourden duty to brove.The object of this is to remove all
possible chance of the testators being ,trlaly Influencea by
them in their favor anci thereby enabling the probate of an
invalid wvilll. So If any benefisial devise be made to a
witness of a will anq hi te;tamony is necessary for its
probatior,the devisc, shall be' void so far as he or those
claiming ,+inder him are concernea ania such a witness shall
be competent and compellible to Lestify respecting the
execution of such a urill as if no silch devise had been mae.
(I .- 65 50) In Re Imil'on 103 'I.Y.37T
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The devise qst he ,erieficial to, him an.i not -irply a trust,
he must be a ;ubsribtnj witness to the will;and such a one
as may be compellei to testify to the exec' tion of the will,
and though not necessarily a com ete-,t witnes$5 N.Y.128) he
must be a necessary witness.So f ' there be three witnesses
to the will and one be a aeviseethe 'ievise to him will not
be vroA under the statute if jurisdiction car be obtaieu
over the other twofor only two witnesges are necessary to
prove a will in this state. Likewise if the witness be a
non-resident of the state at th- time of' the testators death
a devise to him is not void even tho,.,gh he is examined at the
probation of the will for he is not a compellible witness.
Cornwell vs.Wooley 47 Barb.327) _For the object of the statute
is also to secure the benifit of a witness'testimony to the
other benifioiaries when it was indispensible and could be
compelled.
But while subscribing witnesses have by statute been
made incapable devisees,their right to take as heirs has
not been abridged and they will inherit their share of' the
testator's propert'i of which he died intestate. And the
same statute that takes away his right to the devise ,makes
him heir of such of' testators property as would have descendea
4R
to him if the teotator hari rjt(or intestate.(c 1,.'. 5 5I) arna
qectior I t,, o, the Code of Civil Procedare provides for an
action again-,t the other dievisees to recover -iis sh,-re of
the property.
The rights o ,ic' a ,ritness ,r re brought up for judicial
decision in the t'va-,tter of Crmr -4- Cfr.Po.Re;.I2 ara it
wa there &elri that 1J s .cri1lr witr-eqs with,,ut whose
tegtiraory the will coutrd not have ben-- provea is pr,:cludea
fro, taking more that that ;hare of Lhe realtv which wold
have descended to him i. case the will had not be, n estab-
lished.Citing qharpsteii. vs.Tillou 3 Cow .5I &c.
OTHER INCAPABT:E D'Vi F.
Thlilic policy is somaetiriie held to incapacitate sonie
persons f'rcrm becoming beitficiaries. Such was the case of a
devise to an Infidel Society (6.3 Pa.t.4f 3) ana that of a
benificiary who had mirdered his testator,,- case which has
arisen in thiq state.
Palmer v-.Rti-s 115 N.Y.506. The aefendant Palmaer
mtardered hP' rand-f'ather,who had made a will In his favor,in
ordr to prevent its revocation and t , bring himself into
immediate possession of the property. An action was brought
to cancel the will so far as these devises to Palmer were
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concerned a.ri the Cour of Auoeals air so ar. uLlth, will,ir.
effect at least ,holding that it vwa not the irttert ion the leg-
islature to make the general laws of aevise or aescent oper-
ate ir favor of' orc, who had murdered h.i benefactor for this
very puirpose, and that this"as well a; a"! other laws may
be controlled in their o.jeration Anri effect by th-~e fumda-
mertal maxim, of law, namelr that no one shill be penmitted
to profit by his own wrong or acquire property by his own
crime " The ca, e brouight forth a wealth o+' criticisa-favor-
able and otherwise.(See , Tnv.L. -. 9 :JnA 23 Am.L.R. 920 for
247
the decision ard 34 Cent. F,.J. anri 39 Cent.L.J.217 aALa1.
come declaring that the court had itserted * revocatiuII
clause into the statute of Wills;that it had thereby over
stepped the bound. of the juaiciary by making an exception to
the general law of devis(;, 'hich however ju,;t ana necessary
should he made by the legislature and not by the jaaiciary.
Without doubt this was the effect of the decision but it is
also based ipon perfectly sound junlicial principles. The case
was In equity.It is the province of eqaity to afford a relief
where the law i-i inadequate. It now interferes t,. prevent a
man from profiting by his owi wrong. Again it is a rational
Interpretation of the statute of Wills,ir accordance witth
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which"a thing. that is within the Mitention of the makers of
the statute is as much within the statute as if it wer-e within
the letterand a thing which Is within the letter of the
statute is not within the Atatrite uinless it be within the
intention of the makers" That a Mnrrierer shoL1ld have the
benifit of the statute was certainly far from the intention
of the legislatuire.,o it wotla seem that the case was
properly decided althou, h contrary decisions have been reacfea
Ir Nebraska (Schellenberger vs.Ransom V7w.661-) ana Ooio- -w-
TMPOTINT PROVIIONS.
The New York law as to perpetuities is a system widely
difering from the Conmnon law and few of the Common law
principles apply in its operation. It aims directly at the
suspension of the power of alienation. It does not incapaci-
tate a testatot from tying up the property for a certain
time so that there Will be no person in being who can convey
absolute fee,but it does fix the time for the possible
suspension of this power and this is for the term of two
lives in being at the creation of the estate with but one
exception(2 P.S.')W3) Every other future estate shall be void.
If successive life estates are devised with the remainder In
fee,all the life estates subsequent to the two persons first
entitled thereto shall be void anid the remainder take effect
as If no other life estates had been created.
(See I R.S.722-7 ana Am.& Eng. n:y.L. Vol.8 p.370.
C irTONAL ,0KV qI r.) l
Testamentary gifts may be given uuon condition as well
aq absolLutely but not always with the same force and effect.
Sometimes the gift will be entirely destroyed because of the
condition and sometimes the condition will be get aside and
the estate given absolutely.This is atue to the difference
In the kind of condition,lf the estate was one upon condition
precedent and the condition is held to be invalid,the estate
would fail just as though the conrition were va<lid but haa
been broken or never fulfilled.(Martin vs.Bailou,I. Barb. JT9
IT Tin 161- 3 John.Ch.521) But if the estate was one upon
condition subsequent and the condition was declared invalid
the effect would be to destroy the right of reverter merely
and thus give the devisee an absolute estate.(9 Paige 534-
61 How 3717- . D)em.IO8)
'eeping this in mindthe application of the several
decisions as to what are valid conditions to any conditior,,i
lift by devise will solve almost any particular case. They
are to applied strictly in case of conditions precedent
but liberally in case of conditions subsequent.(Schouler on
wills sec.599)
In general,conditions that are a irc,i2.2u ai or tin-
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POsible either in their creation or under existing circuw-
Rtances are void. They may be declarea void when clearly
repugnant to the gift to which they are annexed. As where
the testator,after devisin& the feeattempts to make some
restraint incompatible with full right of domtnton,a3 te,
order it to be cultivated in some particular manner or rented
forever at a certain rent.
ALIENATION.
One of the most commoti conditions declareri void
is that in restraint of alienatior which is hela to be repug-
nant to the fee. (See Perpetuities, Van Renselaer vs.Ball
19 N.Y.IOO- Oxley vq.Lane 3T5 N.Y.346) Although partial res-
traints are allowed.Jackson vs.Schuts 18 John.V34) ara life
estates may be burdeneu with full restrictions.
MARRIAGE.
Not much less common appear those maue in restraint of
marrlage.There is ITRIch aifference of opinion as to these,but
in general I think we can deduce certain general rules.
AS TO TUNOUALII[EJ) RETRAINTS.
Where the restraint is Urjiualified the condition is void.
(Schemerhorn vs.Myers I Denio 448- Depuyster vs.Miichael 6
N.Y.467) This has always been so in the ecclesiastical
courts and has now become ie-neral.
5.3
13it where a person has once been marriedjtibli. policy con
Riders the stal-e protected from degeneratton,so a- condition
that a widow shall not remarry is,lfr modern tiMes,universaliy
uuheld as valid,and the arile a, to a widower.(Chopirn vs
Marvin 12 Wend.53P.,)
OUATALIwIE1 RESTRAINTS
however are no. looker upon with the same severity.(Plumb
vs.Tohbs 41 N.Y.442-Hogan v:--.Ctirtin 125 N.Y.506-Graharn v-
Mrahari 125 N.Y.506) Cornse(,iently i confition that the
benificiary not riarry withoiit the consent of a specified
person;or "o marry or not marry an individual or one class
of Individual-:or to marry or not marry with prescribed
ceremoniesor tinder any fair and reasonable restrictions as
to time place age and other circenstances.
But when a condition demandq the dlssolation of a marriag
or that the partieg live apart it is ield to be a flagrant
violation of ptblnc policy.(O'brien vs.Thjrkley 60 ,N.Y.St.520-
54 ir 552)
CONDITION' NOT TO CONTE-T THE 'WILL4
lifts oC real estate ,iwon condition not to contest the will
are looked upon with di * avor in this state,although they
are to a limited extent Qcened valid.(Bryart vs.Thomoson
9" "t-4 r5A5- \ at trnl of 't(vrart F, N ~
mit ir thi', state it is held that a bona fide inqtiry
whether a will wats procir-ri th:L, i-h frtatri o:.' Iri-lfe i.flence
will not be stifled by any prohibltio o nontai,.ed in the
instrument itself anti "jil ;ot work a for 'clitre. (Jackson
vs.Wlestervelt ,T Ho'ri. 7A)(
PROV IC)N 'ThR7N(, 001W,7-? ANIJ CURTESY.
We have already ;iown how 'he hwrhara is powerless to cut
of hi,; aife Is r1i;t oi riower ii. hi,;e~ ecst~tte dTrrl
explained j-ast1 what proiins he may make as t,. no',,erin
addition and in lieu The'emf. Amd ,'r, have shown Koiv the wife
i empowered t,: cut ofe' her hasbaQa curtesy by Uisposil., of
her property by willi or deed LPd the Connmmor la,,- rule thereby
changed -although the Co,!2on law rul as to provisions cutting
off" dower has not been changed.
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To give the manner of disposition of a persons real
property when he left no will whatev(r .Jo la necessarily be
nothini more than d mere copy of the statate of' 'escent ana
a recitation of the few cases4 tqat have arisen ther'einder.
(I R.S.75I-51 & cases) The statuate is so explicit that the
only diifficulty that can possibly arise is ir the application
of the rule where the circimstances are complicatedla iQ t,)
speculate upon what complications might arise wo l1a be more
than useless.
For outr purpose let it siffice that the real estate of
every person who shall die intestate shall descend first to
his lineal descendants,2nd. o his father,,rd.to his mother ana
4th.to collateral relatives,subject t certain rules ana
regulations. It is therefore seen that the statute applies
to all estates of which the testator has not effectually
disposed by will or otherwise-wliere 'is will is aeclarea in
valid as well as where he Tnade no will-where he was partially
intestate as well as wholly so,whether because of lapse,il-
legality or non-existence of a aevise of. such property.
',o in the case of all provisions which in the preceedinL2
chapters we h&ve shown to be irvalid,the profgerty so
atteipted to be providedc, f'or, oulQ he goverrter l)y these rifles
Aid the same i,; trie where tie benificiaries are 1capable
of accepting the provisions and the devises have thereupon
lapsed.
But the statute of Descent by its own terms shall in
no way af'fect the estates of the husband as tenant by the
curtesy or of' the widow as tenant in dower,nor does it give
precedence to the heirs over the creditors.
But in the case of the former estatesvizrower and curt-
esyestates wqich are temporary in their nature betn- but
life estate-,the statute aoes apply *hen they have been
determined in all case- where the testator has not providea
for the fee.in which these estates eximt.And the same is
V
true of' all remainders for which the testator has faillea
to effectually provide.
C 0 N C L 7J _I 0 1.
Tr no e -sio' ,ther Tore,l h..v( attempted to show what
disposition of a uersou's real -property ulight enAUe under
the most orainary circimistances;havc omitte. entirely the
manner of' is dispositionthe rules of admiritration accord-
ing to which the property Is sold anu contented myself' with
,imply showin- under what circunstances it may be sola;the
proceeding by which tiower an curtesy is assi ,ner ana dave
showr. when dower and curtesy attaches;the proseedings by
which devises are mairtaineq and destroyed,showing only when
they may be maintained and may be destroyed.
In general we have found that death at most only robs
the quondam owner of hls estate and sets in motion laws for
its just and equitable distribution among the living:first
recogniging the rights of the husband and wife as against the
world;then remembering the creditios as havinr, the next bes.
claim to share in the proceeds of their debtor- est&te:;;
acknowledcing th ru the right of the testator tJ sontrol its
distribution to a limited extent,it gives force to the wrltten
expression of his wishes;finally a, a last resortaistribut-
ir it accordir to fixed rules among the relatives of the
deceased who arc. o'.t liable t be the objects of ;is bounty.
t4a-b41j y t
I4~~
~g~2-~
*1- ~
13~u~
r
~
7~
,~-7
N,
~-
~
~ tL~
~
1~t~
1/
17
/
/7
ig
~-
~
d~g/~
4~7 A~~ 6 ~ y4~#
r~
L~
~A~4M ~
~ d ~7A~
1L~tz~~
*-fA-E~~-
~
y~
9r:~
/7
/7
a/.
t/.
34-.
r~-
~Z4A 't -c'-
,~-
-V-~2-
)L~
7~
~
~ ~
~
/
<26 -27
2 J-
17
2/
.2
2
I ~ (A7 /7-/er~
a- ~
- IA.'
r h-~ ~ ~
1L~ 7W~ 6~IL~ /5
~g~Z- Jz~.
~ 6~F
*r ~ ~
~
~- (9~
~
tA~r
~'A~ 2J~.? 7
11
JA
* /0- /j
?A-ite-
6,_o
"Y iAV /2.Z -
I el
/~4AS- t~1~~4A / .,~ -~
A--e. V-c- &t<4_<s
ka~LdojA
leZ'iz-/*
